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The	Alteration	Thesis:	Forgiveness	as	a	Normative	Power		
	
	
ABSTRACT	
What	goes	on	when	one	person	forgives	another?	In	this	paper	I	argue	for	The	Alteration	Thesis:	
that	forgiveness	alters	the	normative	situation	created	by	wrongdoing.	Furthermore,	I	argue	that	
it	does	so	by	means	of	the	exercise	of	a	normative	power.	I	also	argue	that	there	are	two	main	
forms	of	such	forgiveness:	rights-waiving	and	redemptive.	While	forgiveness	may	–	but	does	not	
always	–	alter	obligations	by	waiving	them,	I	claim	that	it	also	alters	the	normative	situation	by	
creating	a	new	obligation	to	the	wrongdoer.	Thinking	of	forgiveness	along	the	lines	suggested	by	
the	Alteration	Thesis	means	going	against	the	tide	of	much	recent	writing	on	forgiveness,	which	
has	seen	forgiveness	as	consisting	essentially	in	a	change	of	heart	towards	the	wrongdoer.	But	I	
argue	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	has	a	number	of	explanatory	advantages	over	the	Change	of	
Heart	approach.	
	
	
What	goes	on	when	one	person	forgives	another? 	In	this	paper	I	argue	for	the	
Alteration	Thesis.	According	to	the	Alteration	Thesis,	forgiveness	alters	the	
normative	situation	created	by	wrongdoing.		
	
The	Alteration	Thesis	is	compatible	with	various	views	about	how	forgiveness	
alters	the	normative	situation.	I	argue	that	the	insight	captured	by	the	Alteration	
Thesis	should	be	articulated	in	terms	of	three	further	theses.	Firstly,	the	
Normative	Power	Thesis:	that	forgiveness	is	primarily	a	normative	rather	than	a	
psychological	phenomenon,	and	involves	the	exercise	of	a	power	to	create,	waive	
or	alter	secondary	obligations	related	to	the	wrongdoing.1	Secondly,	the	
Pluralism	Thesis:	that	because	the	obligations	distinctive	of	situations	of	
																																																								
Versions	of	this	paper	have	been	presented	to	audiences	in	Dublin,	Nottingham,	Manchester,	
Valencia	and	Sheffield,	and	I	am	grateful	for	the	helpful	comments	I	received	on	each	of	those	
occasions.	I	would	particularly	like	to	thank	Lucy	Allais,	Marc	Artiga,	Daniel	Butt,	Josep	Corbí,	
Chris	Cowley,	John	Gardner,	Oliver	Hallich,	Ori	Herstein,	Sandra	Marshall,	Glen	Pettigrove,	Chon	
Tejedor,	Jordi	Valor	Abad	and	Bill	Wringe.	I	received	very	helpful	written	comments	from	Antony	
Duff	and	Peter	Chau.	Conversations	with	Miranda	Fricker,	Cristina	Roadevin	and	David	Owens	
helped	stimulate	my	interest	in	returning	to	the	topic	of	forgiveness.	I	am	also	very	grateful	for	
numerous	insightful	comments	and	questions	from	two	editors	of	this	journal.	
1	The	Alteration	Thesis	is	therefore	closely	related	to	what	Brandon	Warmke	has	called	the	Post-
Forgiveness	Fact:	‘Paradigmatic	cases	of	forgiving	alter	the	norms	of	interaction	for	both	the	
victim	and	the	wrongdoer	in	certain	characteristic	ways.’	See	B.	Warmke,	‘The	Normative	
Significance	of	Forgiveness,’	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy	94	(2016),	pp.	687-703.	
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wrongdoing	are	of	varying	types,	and	because	the	kinds	of	things	we	can	do	with	
these	obligations	vary	according	to	the	type	of	obligation,	there	are	different	
types	of	forgiveness.	(Some	obligations	we	can	waive	at	will,	and	the	waiving	is	
what	forgiveness	consists	in;	others	must	be	discharged	by	the	wrongdoer	
before	forgiveness	is	possible;	some	are	directed	to	the	victim;	others	are	non-
directed).	Thirdly,	the	Commitment	Thesis:	that	the	normative	power	of	
forgiveness,	whether	it	deals	with	obligations	that	have	been	waived	or	
discharged,	also	involves	undertaking	an	obligation	no	longer	to	treat	the	
wrongdoer	as	standing	under	those	obligations.		
	
More	formally,	we	can	express	the	schema	of	forgiveness	to	be	defended	in	this	
paper	as	follows:	forgiveness	as	a	normative	power	involves	1)	either	cancelling	
some	of	the	wrongdoer’s	secondary	obligations	(through	the	exercise	of	a	
normative	power),	or	acknowledging	that	secondary	obligations	have	been	
discharged	(where	acknowledgement	does	not	in	itself	require	any	exercise	of	
normative	power),	and	2)	exercising	a	normative	power	to	undertake	an	
obligation	to	treat	the	wrongdoer	(in	action,	but	also	perhaps	in	feeling	and	
perception),	as	one	who	no	longer	stands	under	those	cancelled	or	discharged	
obligations	(or	at	least	to	work	towards	such	attitudes	and	perceptions).		
	
On	this	account,	any	form	of	forgiveness	falling	under	the	Alteration	Thesis	
involves	2),	that	is,	it	involves	an	exercise	of	normative	power	through	which	one	
undertakes	an	obligation	to	the	wrongdoer	not	to	treat	them	as	one	who	stands	
under	certain	secondary	obligations	in	relation	to	their	wrongdoing.	In	some	
cases	of	forgiveness,	for	instance,	when	one	does	not	have	the	special	standing	of	
being	a	victim	of	the	offense,	one	can	undertake	this	obligation	towards	the	
wrongdoer	on	the	basis	of	an	acknowledgement	that	they	have	now	discharged	
their	obligations	and	no	longer	merit	blame.	Thus,	forgiveness	can	be	what	I	have	
previously	called	redemptive	forgiveness,	since	it	recognizes	that	a	form	of	
redemption	has	been	achieved	by	the	fulfilment	of	the	secondary	obligations.2	Or	
																																																								
2	C.	Bennett,	‘Personal	and	Redemptive	Forgiveness,’	European	Journal	of	Philosophy	11	(2003),	
pp.	127-144.	The	account	of	forgiveness	given	in	the	present	paper	diverges	from	the	position	
put	forward	in	my	earlier	paper	in	the	crucial	respect	that	the	latter	was	what	I	now	characterize	
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it	can	be	pre-emptive	victim’s	forgiveness,	which	is	a	rights-waiving	forgiveness,	
where	a	victim	can	take	away	the	obligation	of	a	wrongdoer	to	apologize	and	
give	compensation	for	the	wrong	done	to	the	victim.	But	in	either	case,	for	it	to	
be	the	kind	of	forgiveness	captured	by	the	Alteration	Thesis,	it	must	involve	an	
undertaking	made,	explicitly	or	not,	to	the	wrongdoer.	It	may,	but	does	not	
always,	alter	the	normative	situation	created	by	wrongdoing	by	removing	
obligations;	but	it	also	alters	that	situation	by	elaborating	it,	by	adding	new	
obligations	directed	to	the	wrongdoer.	This	helps	us	to	account	for	the	fact	that	
forgiving	is	thought	of	as	something	one	should	only	do	when	ready	–	a	feature	
for	which	theories	that	view	forgiveness	as	the	voluntary	exercise	of	a	power	are	
sometimes	thought	unable	to	account.	Or	so,	at	any	rate,	I	will	argue	in	what	
follows.	
	
In	Section	1,	I	set	the	scene	by	considering	some	of	the	things	a	theory	of	
forgiveness	should	explain.	Section	2	introduces	the	Alteration	Thesis,	using	
David	Owens’s	recent	work	as	a	foil.	Sections	3,	4	and	5	then	explain,	defend	and	
illustrate	the	Alteration	Thesis	and	its	three	component	theses.	Section	6	rejects	
some	initial	objections;	and	Section	7	shows	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	has	
greater	explanatory	power	than	its	most	promising	rival.	Sections	8	considers	
some	further	objections	and	implications	of	the	view;	and	Section	9	concludes.	
	
1.	
Let‘s	start	by	considering	some	of	the	things	a	theory	of	forgiveness	will	need	to	
explain.	First	of	all,	forgiveness	is	not	simply	a	religious	matter,	and	
forgivingness	not	simply	a	virtue	of	the	religious.	It	might	not	be	an	exaggeration	
to	say	that	all	societies	need	processes	by	which	those	who	violate	value-norms	
can	be	re-accepted	into	social	life	on	good	terms	without	the	authority	of	those	
norms	being	placed	in	question.3	Secondly,	forgiveness	is	an	interpersonal	
interaction	in	the	sense	that	it	is	given	and	sometimes	(though	not	always)	
explicitly	granted	by	one	person	to	another.	This	is	compatible	with	the	party	
																																																								
as	a	Change	of	Heart	view,	and	had	no	place	for	the	Alteration,	Normative	Power	and	
Commitment	Theses.	
3	A.	Oldenquist,	‘The	Explanation	of	Retribution,’	Journal	of	Philosophy	85	(1988).	
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who	is	forgiven	being	dead,	or	being	unaware	that	forgiveness	has	taken	place;	
and,	if	self-forgiveness	is	possible,	with	the	giver	and	the	recipient	being	one.	
Thirdly,	the	need	for	forgiveness	comes	about	when	the	party	to	be	forgiven	has	
committed	some	wrong:	either	something	that	is	wrong	all	things	considered,	or	
something	that	wrongs	a	particular	person	in	such	a	way	as	to	give	that	person	a	
corresponding	right	to	demand	an	apology	or	compensation	for	the	infraction.	
Fourthly,	forgiveness	is	often	an	emotional	and	intimate	matter,	but	it	need	not	
be.	There	are	cases	where	the	question	of	whether	to	forgive	is	one	about	which	
a	person	deliberates	for	years,	and	which	dominates	their	emotional	life.	One	
question	that	a	person	might	be	wondering	about	in	such	cases	is	whether	they	
are	ready	to	forgive.	However,	there	are	many	cases	of	slights	that	are	not	
negligible	but	that	are	forgiven	easily,	without	much	thought,	as	an	
unremarkable	part	of	ongoing	social	life.		
	
A	fully	developed	philosophical	theory	of	forgiveness,	as	well	as	explaining	what	
goes	on	when	one	person	forgiveness	another,	should	shed	light	on	a	number	of	
other	questions,	such	as:	who	is	in	a	position	to	forgive;	what	kinds	of	acts,	
mental	or	otherwise	(or	attitudes	–	or	what	combination	of	the	two)	are	
necessary	and	sufficient	for	one	person	to	have	forgiven	another;	what	kinds	of	
obligation	the	wrongdoer	has	in	virtue	of	their	wrongdoing;	and	how	forgiveness	
is	involved	in	these	obligations	coming	to	an	end.		
	
A	theory	of	forgiveness	should	also	be	able	to	explain	the	ways	in	which	it	
matters	to	us	to	forgive	and	be	forgiven.	One	way	in	which	it	matters	to	us	to	be	
forgiven	is	shown	by	the	familiarity	of	the	fact	that	repentant	wrongdoers	will	
sometimes	seek	out	their	victims	and	look	for	their	forgiveness,	often	going	to	
great	lengths	to	do	so.	An	illustration	is	found	in	the	following	scenario	from	
Simon	Wiesenthal’s	memoir,	The	Sunflower.4	An	SS	officer,	Karl,	who	participated	
in	an	atrocity	in	which	Jewish	men,	women	and	children	were	massacred	is	
seriously	injured	and	approaching	death.	He	is	now	an	inmate	in	a	field	hospital	
																																																								
4	S.	Wiesenthal,	The	Sunflower:	On	the	Possibilities	and	Limits	of	Forgiveness	(New	York:	Schocken,	
1976).	For	another	discussion	of	this	case,	see	T.	Govier,	Forgiveness	and	Revenge	(New	York:	
Routledge,	2002).		
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in	which	Simon,	the	narrator,	is	working.	Karl	is	apparently	overcome	with	
remorse	when	he	thinks	about	what	he	did,	and,	as	death	grows	near,	he	feels	
impelled	to	look	for	a	Jewish	victim	of	the	Nazi	Endlösung	in	which	he	took	part,	
and	ask	for	forgiveness.		
	
This	scenario	is	complex	in	part	because	Simon	is	not	a	direct	victim	of	Karl’s	
actions;	nevertheless,	it	seems	as	though	Karl’s	asking	for	a	Jewish	victim	of	the	
Nazi	project	is	not	accidental	–	there	is	a	connection	to	Simon	that	makes	it	
morally	intelligible	to	ask	him	for	a	kind	of	forgiveness	that	could	not	come	from	
e.g.	a	German	civilian.	I	take	it,	therefore,	that	the	scenario	illustrates	one	key	
point:	the	comprehensibility	of	a	person	feeling	an	urgent	need,	before	he	dies,	to	
be	forgiven	by	a	person	who	can	intelligibly	be	thought	of	as	a	victim	of	his	
wrongdoing.	One	skeptical	character	later	in	Wiesenthal’s	narrative	suggests	
that	the	SS	officer	would	have	been	better	to	approach	a	priest	if	what	he	wanted	
was	to	gain	absolution.	Nevertheless,	it	seems	that	for	many	of	us,	perhaps	
including	Karl	himself,	such	absolution	is	not	enough,	and	that	the	relation	to	the	
victim	is	central.	What	we	want	is	not	simply	an	authoritative	verdict	on	our	
wrongs,	but	a	particular	relation	to	the	people	we	have	wronged.	The	way	the	
Alteration	Thesis	explains	this	is	to	say	that	we	want	forgiveness	because	we	
want	the	normative	situation	to	be	altered	in	ways	that	only	the	victim	can	alter	
it.		
	
We	also	need	to	explain	why	it	matters	to	forgive.	Simon	refuses	Karl’s	request,	
and	then	cannot	decide	whether	he	did	the	right	thing.	Forgiving	can	be	
something	that	we	deliberate	over,	agree	or	refuse	to	do,	affirm	or	regret	once	
we	have	done	it.	Some	of	Simon’s	concerns	have	to	do	with	whether	it	was	his	
place	to	forgive	for	the	deaths	of	others.	But	underpinning	his	reflections	is	also	a	
sense	that	forgiving	is	not	merely	like	granting	a	favor.	The	Alteration	Thesis	
says	that,	in	forgiving,	Simon	would	alter	the	normative	situation	existing	
between	him	and	Karl.	However,	his	reflections	are	not	simply	about	whether	to	
alter	that	situation	in	ways	beneficial	to	a	dying	person.	His	confusion	is	not	
simply	about	whether	to	do	something	kind	to	someone	who	might	be	said	
hardly	to	deserve	such	kindness.	Karl’s	request	weighs	on	him	like	a	heavy	
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responsibility	that	cannot	be	explained	if	we	think	of	forgiveness	merely	as	a	
kind	of	benevolence;	it	is	rather	as	though	in	forgiving	he	will	now	be	
responsible	for	something,	and	he	is	wondering	whether	to	commit	himself	to	
that.	An	account	of	forgiveness	should	explain	in	what	way	forgiving	can	appear	
to	a	potential	forgiver	not	as	a	simple	favor,	and	not	simply	as	putting	an	end	to	
the	matter,	but	rather	as	commitment	in	its	own	right.		
	
In	this	paper	I	argue	that	these	features	can	best	be	explained	by	the	Alteration	
Thesis.	But	we	should	enter	a	caveat.	As	Miranda	Fricker	has	argued	in	
unpublished	work,	human	cultures	are	creative	entities,	and	are	forever	taking	
the	basic	conceptual	ingredients	of	practices	and	extending	or	blending	them.5	It	
would	be	surprising,	in	fact,	if	something	as	venerable	and	as	indispensable	as	
the	practice	of	forgiveness	were	to	fit	neatly	and	univocally	into	a	set	of	
necessary	and	sufficient	conditions.	As	we	will	see,	even	the	forgiveness	
captured	by	the	Alteration	Thesis	has	to	be	seen	as	taking	more	than	one	form.	
But	it	is	not	necessary	to	my	argument	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	captures	
everything	that	can	sensibly	be	called	forgiveness.	The	Alteration	Thesis	should	
not	be	taken	as	implying	that	it	is	wrong	in	ordinary	speech	to	refer	to	anything	
as	forgiveness	unless	it	has	this	role	in	altering	the	normative	situation	created	
by	wrongdoing.	Nevertheless,	I	hope	that	with	the	Alteration	Thesis	I	captures	a	
central,	perhaps	paradigmatic	form	of	forgiveness.	
	
2.	
The	claim	that	forgiveness	alters	the	normative	situation	has	recently	been	
defended	by	David	Owens.6	According	to	Owens,	forgiveness	requires	a	certain	
standing	or	authority	that	one	acquires	only	by	being	a	victim	of	some	
wrongdoing.	In	contrast	to	what	he	calls	‘mere	wrongs’	–	that	is	acts	of	
wrongdoing	that	wrong	no	one	–	the	fact	of	having	been	subjected	to	a	wrong	
gives	one	a	right	to	forgive	over	the	exercise	of	which	one	has	some	discretion.	
As	he	puts	it:	‘The	wronged	party	has	a	right	to	forgive	a	wrong	committed	
																																																								
5	M.	Fricker,	‘Explaining	Forgiveness’	MS;	see	also	M.	Fricker,	‘What’s	the	Point	of	Blame?	A	
Paradigm-Based	Explanation,’	Noûs	50	(2016),	pp.	165-183;	Warmke,	‘Normative	Significance	of	
Forgiveness.’		
6	D.	Owens,	Shaping	the	Normative	Landscape	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012).	
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against	them	that	bystanders	lack	and	which	no	one	has	with	respect	to	mere	
wrongs.’7	Furthermore,	he	identifies	the	act	of	forgiving	with	the	ability	to	alter	
the	normative	situation.	Through	forgiveness	the	victim	alters	the	normative	
situation	of	the	wrongdoer,	but	also	that	of	any	third	parties	who	had	been	
previously	disposed	to	blame	the	wrongdoer.	In	Owens’s	view,	the	change	that	
forgiveness	brings	about	is	to	make	it	no	longer	fitting	to	experience	blame	and	
guilt	in	regard	to	this	wronging.		
	
‘Once	the	wrongdoer	has	been	forgiven	in	the	relevant	sense,	it	is	no	
longer	apt	for	them	to	feel	guilty	and	it	is	positively	inapt	for	others	to	
blame	them;	both	resentment	and	indignation	are	now	out	of	place.’8	
	
For	Owens,	therefore,	the	victim	has	the	central	power	of	forgiveness	–	though	
he	recognizes	the	possibility	that	one	might	not	be	able	to	forgive	at	will,	and	
that	one	might	say	one	has	forgiven	without	actually	having	forgiven	–	and	
forgiveness	alters	the	normative	situation	by	altering	the	fittingness	of	guilt	and	
blame.		
	
However,	Owens’s	understanding	of	how	forgiveness	alters	the	normative	
situation	is	problematic.	It	leaves	him	committed	to	the	claim	that	it	would	be	
unfitting	for	a	wrongdoer	who	has	never	experienced	guilt	prior	to	having	been	
forgiven	to	feel	it	once	they	have	been	forgiven.	This	is	implausible,	since	the	
wrongdoer	has	a	continuing	obligation	to	reform	of	which	the	victim’s	
forgiveness	cannot	relieve	him;	and	if	we	take	the	view	that	emotions	such	as	
guilt	are	not	mere	feelings	but	have	a	cognitive	component,	we	might	well	think	
that	guilt	is	essential	to	moral	understanding	and	redemption.	For	instance,	we	
might	be	skeptical	of	one	who	claimed	to	have	fully	understood	and	to	care	about	
their	having	done	wrong,	but	who	did	not	in	any	way	feel	bad	about	it.	Guilt	is	
the	feeling	of	self-disapproval	or	self-blame,	of	the	repudiation	of	the	wrongful	
action	and	the	part	of	oneself	that	endorsed	it,	and	it	is	hard	to	see	how	someone	
could	experience	their	situation	as	one	in	which	they	merited	blame	without	
																																																								
7	D.	Owens,	Shaping	the	Normative	Landscape,	p.	51.	
8	Owens,	Shaping	the	Normative	Landscape,	p.	51.	
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feeling	guilt	about	it.	But	if	this	is	correct,	and	if	seeing	themselves	as	the	proper	
object	of	blame	is	an	advance	in	their	understanding	of	their	situation,	it	is	hard	
to	see	how	they	can	make	that	advance	without	feeling	guilty	about	it.	In	which	
case	we	should	conclude	that	feeling	guilty	is	an	essential	part	of	understanding	
their	situation	properly,	and	that	the	wrongdoer’s	obligation	to	feel	guilty,	or	to	
cultivate	such	feelings,	is	one	of	which	the	victim’s	discretionary	forgiveness	
cannot	relieve	them.	This	is	an	obligation	that	can	be	removed	only	by	
discharging	it;	not	by	having	it	waived	by	the	victim.	
	
Furthermore,	Owens	does	not	do	justice	to	the	thought	that	forgiveness	might	be	
a	commitment	in	its	own	right.	The	closest	he	comes	to	this	is	in	arguing	that	a	
person	might	say	they	have	forgiven	but	then	realize	later	that	they	had	not,	a	
phenomenon	he	takes	to	count	against	thinking	of	forgiveness	as	a	normative	
power.9	In	making	this	point	he	recognizes	that	there	is	more	to	forgiveness	than	
granting	a	simple	favor.	The	conclusion	he	draws	from	this	is	that	forgiveness	
must	involve	changing	one’s	heart	rather	than	exercising	a	voluntary	normative	
power.	However,	Simon’s	sense	of	the	responsibilities	of	forgiving	is	not	well	
explained	by	the	claim	that	he	is	considering	changing	his	heart.	The	explanation	
we	need,	I	will	claim,	is	that	forgiveness	is	indeed	a	normative	power	that	
involves	undertaking	a	commitment	to	the	wrongdoer.	So	while	the	Alteration	
Thesis	captures	an	important	truth	in	Owens’s	account,	seeing	what	this	truth	
amounts	to	will	mean	being	more	careful	than	Owens	about	the	kinds	of	
normative	changes	that	forgiveness	can	bring	about.		
	
3.	
To	begin	with	we	need	to	say	some	more	about	‘the	normative	situation	created	
by	wrongdoing;’	once	we	have	an	idea	of	what	is	meant	by	that	we	can	look	at	
the	way	in	which	that	situation	may	be	altered.	To	avoid	confusion,	I	will	use	the	
terminology	of	primary	and	secondary	obligations.10	We	can	think	of	the	initial	
																																																								
9	‘One	may	sincerely	intend	to	forgive,	communicate	this	intention	to	the	wrongdoer,	and	still	fail	
to	forgive	because	the	requisite	psychological	changes	have	not	occurred;	one	continues	to	blame	
just	as	before.’	Owens,	Shaping	the	Normative	Landscape,	p.	53.	
10	This	terminology	seems	to	go	back	to	Blackstone	and	Austin.	For	some	discussion,	see	P.	Birks,	
‘Rights,	Wrongs	and	Remedies,’	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	20	(2000),	pp.	1-37.		
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act	of	wrongdoing	as	a	violation	of	certain	primary	obligations,	as	a	result	of	
which	new	secondary	obligations	arise.11	Some	of	these	secondary	obligations	
belong	to	the	wrongdoer.	The	wrongdoer’s	secondary	obligations	can	be	
directed:	for	instance,	the	obligation	to	apologize	to	the	victim,	or	to	make	
restitution	for	harm	or	damage	caused.	But	they	can	also	be	non-directed,	such	
as	the	obligation	to	cultivate	proportionate	feelings	of	guilt	or	remorse	about	the	
offense,	to	take	steps	not	to	(be	tempted	to)	do	it	again,	and	to	redeem	oneself	
through	penitential	actions	of	atonement.	Indeed,	in	the	case	of	wrongdoing	that	
wrongs	no	one,	the	only	such	obligations	incurred	by	the	wrongdoer	would	be	
non-directed.	However,	it	is	not	only	the	wrongdoer	who	incurs	secondary	
obligations	as	a	result	of	the	wrongdoing:	any	party	relevantly	connected	to	the	
circumstances	of	the	offense	–	whether	third	party,	victim	or	offender	–	can	
acquire	obligations	to	condemn	or	denounce	it	or	‘call	it	out,’	to	support	its	
victim,	or	at	the	very	least	not	to	condone	it	or	acquiesce	in	it	by	treating	the	
wrongdoer	as	if	everything	were,	morally	speaking,	business	as	usual	(indeed	it	
is	the	offender’s	obligation	not	to	treat	herself	as	if	everything	was	business	as	
usual	that	can	be	thought	of	as	the	source	of	whatever	penitential	obligations	
there	are).	For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	we	don’t	have	to	further	specify	what	
exactly	it	means	to	be	‘relevantly	connected,’	but	the	thought	is	that,	although	not	
every	moral	agent	has	a	secondary	obligation	to	take	action	in	response	to	
wrongdoing,	a	failure	to	take	action	can	sometimes	amount	to	complicity	in	that	
wrong.	
	
These	secondary	obligations,	it	should	be	noted,	are	pro	tanto	or	defeasible.	
Thus,	a	person	may	be	under	a	pro	tanto	obligation	to	call	out	the	wrongdoer,	
and	to	distance	themselves	from	the	wrongdoer’s	behavior;	but	it	may	be	that,	in	
the	circumstances,	complying	with	that	obligation	would	be	too	costly	to	other	
																																																								
11	If	retributivism	is	the	theory	of	backward-looking	responses	to	wrongdoing	–	that	is,	responses	
that	are	justified	in	terms	other	than	the	consequences	that	will	contingently	come	from	those	
responses	–	then	what	I	provide	in	the	rest	of	this	section	of	the	text	can	be	thought	of	as	a	theory	
of	retribution,	that	is,	a	theory	of	the	non-instrumentally	justified	obligations	that	arise	by	virtue	
of	wrongdoing.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	while	this	theory	may	be	termed	retributive,	
it	does	not	necessarily	specify	that	the	wrongdoer	needs	to	be	made	to	suffer:	the	claim	that	
wrongdoers	should	be	made	to	suffer	would	be	a	specific	theory	of	retribution,	or	a	specific	
theory	of	the	relevant	secondary	obligations.	
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social	goods	that	they	have	a	duty	to	protect.	However,	although	they	are	in	this	
way	defeasible	and	hence	exhibit	some	context-sensitivity,	these	obligations	are	
not	normally	merely	instrumentally	justified.	Although	their	justifying	grounds	
may	be	various,	I	take	it	that	these	secondary	obligations	have	a	basically	
backward-looking	role	in	addressing	or	doing	justice	to	the	violation	that	does	
not	reduce	to	the	tendency	of	our	behaving	in	that	way	to	promote	other	social	
goods.	They	can	be	thought	of	as	a	form	of	‘appropriate	response’	to	the	
wrongdoing.	Wrongdoers	in	varying	situations	gain	non-instrumental	secondary	
obligations	simply	in	virtue	of	their	offense,	to	do	things	by	way	of	making	up	for	
their	initial	transgression;	and	those	‘relevantly	connected’	to	the	offense	gain	
obligations	not	to	treat	the	wrongdoer	as	if	everything	were	normal	until	there	is	
evidence	that	the	wrongdoer	is	making	significant	efforts	to	discharge	their	
secondary	obligations.	
	
4.	
The	Alteration	Thesis	says	that	forgiveness	alters	this	normative	situation:	that	
is,	it	alters	something	about	these	secondary	obligations.	However,	forgiveness	is	
a	distinctive	way	of	altering	these	secondary	obligations:	through	the	exercise	of	
a	normative	power.	To	see	what	is	distinctive	about	this,	consider	the	fact	that	
one	way	to	alter	one’s	secondary	obligations	is	to	discharge	them.	Once	
discharged	–	assuming	that	they	can	be	discharged	–	the	obligations	no	longer	
apply	to	one,	and	hence	one	has	altered	the	secondary	obligations	one	is	under.	
However,	the	act	of	discharging	one’s	secondary	obligations	is	not	the	same	as	an	
act	of	forgiveness.	Furthermore,	one	can	quite	coherently	–	and	often	properly	–	
recognize	that	a	person	has	discharged	their	obligations	and	yet	refuse	to	forgive	
them.	Therefore,	forgiveness	is	a	distinctive	way	of	altering	secondary	
obligations.	In	forgiving	we	grant	something	to	the	offender	that	alters	these	
secondary	obligations:	in	the	act	of	granting	one	brings	about	a	change	in	the	
normative	situation.	The	Normative	Power	Thesis	holds	that	forgiveness	is	a	
distinctive	way	of	altering	secondary	obligations	because	it	involves	a	power	to	
alter	obligations	by	means	of	one’s	voluntary	acts,	exercised	by	one	who	is	in	
possession	of	that	power	(i.e.	has	standing	to	exercise	it).		
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This	language	of	‘powers’	is	often	traced	back	to	Hohfeld	in	his	analysis	of	the	
range	of	things	that	might	be	meant	by	‘having	a	(legal)	right’.12	Powers	are	often	
tied	to	standing	and	roles.	For	instance,	it	is	part	of	the	way	that	the	legal	role	of	
Prime	Minister	is	constructed	in	the	United	Kingdom	that	whoever	occupies	the	
role	has	the	power	to	appoint	other	persons	to	become	ministers	in	the	Cabinet,	
thus	conferring	or	bestow	legal	rights	(and	legal	responsibilities)	on	particular	
persons.	A	number	of	authors	have	argued	that	it	is	also	illuminating	to	talk	
about	non-legal	normative	powers	ranging	in	a	similar	way	over	non-legal	rights	
and	obligations.13	Not	all	powers	are	associated	with	specific	roles	or	situations,	
however.	Promising,	for	instance,	seems	to	be	a	power	that	is	generally	
possessed,	given	the	right	kind	of	competence,	voluntarily	to	give	a	person	right	
to	one’s	performance	through	freely	choosing	to	do	so.	According	to	the	
Normative	Power	Thesis,	forgiveness	is	also	a	power	voluntarily	to	alter	certain	
obligations:	specifically,	a	power	to	alter	secondary	obligations	that	arise	from	
the	violation	of	primary	obligations.		
	
If	forgiveness	is	a	normative	power,	does	it	require	standing	that	only	the	victim	
can	possess?	Yes	and	no.	Victims	have	a	distinctive	normative	power	because	
they	are	victims;	but	they	also	have	a	different	but	related	power	to	forgive	that	
any	party	relevantly	connected	to	the	offence	has.	As	my	Pluralism	Thesis	holds,	
there	are	different	types	of	forgiveness,	one	belonging	only	to	the	victim,	and	one	
held	by	any	relevantly	connected	party.	To	see	why	this	is	so,	recall	that	there	
are	various	types	of	secondary	obligations	in	play,	and	our	ability	to	alter	these	
obligations	varies	across	these	types.	We	saw	that	some	of	these	obligations	are	
directed	obligations	owed	to	the	victim	(for	instance,	to	apologise	and	repair	
harm	caused).	The	victim	has	authority	over	these	directed	obligations,	and	can	
waive	them	if	they	choose	to	do	so;	this	is	the	kernel	of	truth	in	the	idea	that	the	
																																																								
12	W.	N.	Hohfeld,	‘Fundamental	Legal	Conceptions	as	Applied	in	Judicial	Reasoning,’	Yale	Law	
Journal	26	(1917),	pp.	710-770.	As	Hart	points	out,	Bentham	also	attempts	a	systematic	analysis:	
H.	L.	A.	Hart,	‘Bentham	on	Legal	Powers,’	in	Essays	on	Bentham:	Jurisprudence	and	Political	Theory	
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1982),	pp.	194-219.	
13	J.	Raz,	Practical	Reason	and	Norms	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1975),	pp.	98-104;	G.	
Watson,	‘Promises,	Reasons	and	Normative	Powers,’	in	D.	Sobel	and	S.	Wall	(eds),	Reasons	for	
Action	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010),	pp.	155-178;	D.	Owens,	Shaping	the	
Normative	Landscape,	pp.	4-5.		
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victim	has	a	special	standing	to	forgive	that	other	parties	do	not	have.	However,	
as	well	as	directed	obligations	to	the	victim,	wrongdoing	also	incurs	non-
directed	obligations	such	as	the	obligation	to	repent	and	make	penitential	
amends.	Furthermore,	third	parties	gain	non-directed	obligations	not	to	treat	the	
wrongdoer	as	if	relations	were	normal	–	at	least	not	until	they	have	made	some	
reparative	efforts.	As	we	argued	against	Owens,	the	victim	has	no	authority	to	
waive	these	non-directed	obligations.	The	victim	does	not	have	the	power	to	
make	the	wrongdoer’s	guilt	inapt,	or	to	relieve	them	of	penitential	obligations,	or	
to	change	others’	obligations	to	distance	themselves	from	the	wrongdoer	by	
making	it	inapt	for	them	to	blame.	Nevertheless,	the	wrongdoer	can	discharge	
those	obligations,	and	the	discharging	of	these	obligations	will	also	have	the	
effect	of	bringing	third	parties’	obligations	to	an	end.	Furthermore,	bringing	
these	obligations	to	an	end	seems	to	have	something	to	do	with	forgiveness.	
After	all,	this	is	why	writers	on	forgiveness	often	mention	the	possibility	of	
earning	forgiveness.	It	also	explains	why	forgiveness	can	be	intelligible	even	in	
the	case	of	wrongdoing	that	does	not	wrong	anyone	in	particular.	
	
To	accommodate	this,	we	need	some	form	of	pluralism.	Forgiveness,	we	should	
say,	can	be	of	two	types.	It	can	be	rights-waiving	forgiveness,	exercising	a	power	
held	by	the	victim;	or	it	can	be	redemptive	forgiveness,	which	acknowledges	that	
the	offender	has	redeemed	themselves	by	discharging	their	obligations.	
Nevertheless,	we	are	not	quite	there	yet,	since	acknowledging	that	these	
obligations	have	been	discharged	does	not	yet	seem	to	be	a	form	of	forgiveness.	
Consider	the	case	of	someone	who	accepts	an	apology	from	a	person	who	
wrongs	them,	and	indicates	that	they	are	prepared	to	consider	the	matter	closed	
for	all	practical	purposes,	but	who	nevertheless	insists	that	they	have	not	
thereby	forgiven.	This	seems	quite	intelligible	–	but	what	is	it	that	the	forgiver	is	
refusing	to	do,	and	why	would	they	refuse	to	do	it?	As	the	Alteration	Thesis	
maintains,	forgiveness	alters	the	normative	situation,	and	mere	
acknowledgement	that	the	wrongdoer’s	secondary	obligations	have	been	
discharged	does	not	do	this.	But	what	kind	of	power	can	forgiveness	be	when	it	
is	not	the	power	to	waive	obligations?	One	type	of	forgiveness	involves	the	
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power	to	waive	obligations	–	but	can	there	also	be	forgiveness	when	those	
obligations	have	been	discharged	and	there	is	nothing	left	to	waive?		
	
These	questions	are	answered	by	my	Commitment	Thesis:	that	there	is	a	further	
power	of	forgiveness	that	pertains	to	cases	where	obligations	have	been	
discharged	as	well	as	cases	in	which	they	have	been	waived	by	the	victim;	and	
which	further	power	can	be	held	by	the	victim,	but	can	also	be	held	by	relevantly	
connected	parties	who	are	not	themselves	victims.	This	is	the	power	of	the	
forgiver	to	put	herself	under	an	obligation	to	the	offender.14	Secondary	
obligations	created	by	forgiveness	are	not,	however,	restitutive	or	penitential	
obligations	belonging	to	the	wrongdoer.	Rather,	they	are	directed	obligations	
owed	to	the	wrongdoer	by	the	party	doing	the	forgiving.15	As	we	have	seen,	it	is	
possible	for	the	secondary	obligations	incurred	by	wrongdoing	to	be	altered,	
either	by	waiving	or	discharging.	In	either	case	a	new	attitude	to	the	wrongdoer	
becomes	appropriate:	rather	than	seeing	him	as	one	who	stands	under	certain	
obligations	that	prevent	normal	relations	to	obtain	between	the	parties,	it	now	
becomes	appropriate	to	see	him	as	one	who	is	free	of	such	obligations.	A	change	
of	heart	becomes	appropriate.	This	change	of	heart	does	not	by	itself	amount	to	
forgiveness,	however.	One	may	have	such	a	change	of	heart,	and	regard	it	as	
appropriate,	but	still	refuse	to	forgive	–	because,	as	we	have	seen,	forgiving	
involves	entering	into	a	new	normative	relationship	with	the	offender.	In	
forgiving,	therefore,	one	does	not	simply	waive	secondary	obligations	or	register	
their	having	been	discharged;	rather	one	enters	into	a	commitment	to	the	
wrongdoer	no	longer	to	treat	him	as	standing	under	those	obligations.		
	
																																																								
14	The	situation	considered	in	the	text	might	be	thought	of	as	analogous	to	a	case	Joseph	Raz	and	
David	Owens	draw	attention	to	in	respect	of	promising:	where	a	person	says,	‘You	can	have	every	
confidence	that	I	will	be	there,	and	rely	on	me;	but	I	am	not	promising	you	that	I	will	be	there.’	
The	distinction	between	a	promise	and	an	invitation	to	reliance	insisted	upon	in	this	example	
rests	on	the	refusal	to	put	oneself	under	a	specific	obligation	to	the	addressee,	and	give	them	
rights	with	respect	to	one’s	conduct	(and,	in	the	case	of	forgiveness,	attitudes).	See	J.	Raz,	
‘Promises	and	Obligations’	in	P.	M.	S.	Hacker	and	J.	Raz	(eds),	Law	Morality	and	Society:	Essays	in	
Honour	of	H.	L.	A.	Hart	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1972),	pp.	210-238,	at	p.	216;	D.	Owens,	
‘A	Simple	Theory	of	Promising,’	Philosophical	Review	115	(2006),	pp.	51-77,	at	p.	60.	
15	For	this	reason	one	might	wish	to	call	them	‘tertiary	obligations,’	but	for	simplicity	I	will	stick	
with	‘secondary.’	
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The	Commitment	Thesis	explains	why	Simon	felt	forgiving	as	a	weighty	
responsibility,	and	why	in	general	victims	are	sometimes	wary	of	forgiving;	why	
it	can	be	rational	–	and	contrary	to	Kolnai,	not	vindictive16	–	to	refuse	to	forgive	
even	when	the	conditions	that	make	forgiveness	appropriate	are	acknowledged	
to	be	in	place;	and	why	one	might	feel	that	one	can	only	forgive	when	one	is	
ready	(and	why	one	might	regret	having	forgiven	after	the	event).17	Forgiveness	
involves	undertaking	to	treat	the	wrongdoer	differently	and	work	towards	
changing	one’s	heart	towards	them.	This	change	of	heart	does	not	involve,	as	in	
Jean	Hampton’s	view,	no	longer	seeing	the	wrongdoer	as	‘rotten.’18	As	Lucy	Allais	
has	observed,	the	problem	with	this	is	that	it	makes	the	object	of	forgiveness	the	
victim’s	attitude	to	the	offender	as	a	whole	and	doesn’t	tie	forgiveness	
specifically	enough	to	the	offense	in	question.19	Rather	the	change	of	stance	is	
more	plausibly	thought	of	as	‘bracketing’	at	least	some	of	the	normative	effects	of	
that	particular	wrongdoing	as	a	basis	for	one’s	relationship	with	the	wrongdoer,	
and	making	it	the	case	that	one	will	wrong	him	should	one	go	back	on	one’s	
undertaking	and	start	to	treat	him	as	one	who	stands	under	those	obligations	of	
which	he	is	now	free.20		
	
Thus	when	I	say	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	is	to	be	understood	as	the	thesis	that	
forgiveness	alters	the	normative	situation	arising	from	wrongdoing,	this	should	
not	be	understood	simply	in	terms	of	the	offender’s	obligations,	or	the	
obligations	of	third	parties	to	distance	themselves	from	wrongdoing;	the	
‘normative	situation	arising	from	wrongdoing’	that	can	be	altered	by	forgiveness	
should	be	understood	as	including	obligations	undertaken	by	the	person	
forgiving	to	the	wrongdoer.	The	reason	that	standing	to	forgive	is	not	only	held	
																																																								
16	A.	Kolnai,	‘Forgiveness,’	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	74	(1973-4),	pp.	91-106,	at	p.	98.	
17	M.	Holmgren,	‘Forgiveness	and	the	Intrinsic	Value	of	Persons,’	American	Philosophical	
Quarterly	30	(1993),	pp.	341-352.	
18	J.	Hampton,	‘Forgiveness,	Resentment	and	Hatred,’	in	J.	G.	Murphy	and	J.	Hampton,	Forgiveness	
and	Mercy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988).	The	other	main	problem	with	
Hampton’s	view	is	(as	with	the	Change	of	Heart	view	of	which	it	is	a	variant)	that	it	identifies	
forgiveness	with	the	change	in	‘way	of	seeing’	the	offender	rather	than	the	normative	process	by	
which	one	undertakes	a	commitment	to	change	one’s	way	of	seeing	the	offender.		
19	L.	Allais,	‘Wiping	the	Slate	Clean:	the	Heart	of	Forgiveness,’	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	
36(2008),	pp.	33-68.	
20	For	the	language	of	‘bracketing,’	see	E.	Garrard	and	D.	MacNaughton,	‘In	Defence	of	
Unconditional	Forgiveness,’	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	103	(2003),	pp.	39-60.	
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by	the	victim	is	therefore	that	any	agent	relevantly	connected	to	the	offence	has	
the	power	to	undertake	such	obligations.	Anyone	in	the	relevant	position	can	
undertake	not	to	treat	the	wrongdoer	as	though	they	are	still	under	the	
secondary	obligations.	They	are	free	to	exercise	this	power	or	not	to	exercise	it.	
However,	it	is	only	appropriate	to	exercise	it	when	the	offender	has	discharged	
their	own	secondary	obligations,	or	at	least	is	making	decisive	efforts	to	do	so:	
otherwise	the	forgiver	would	be	open	to	the	criticism	that	they	are	not	taking	the	
secondary	obligations	–	and	hence	the	wrongdoing	–	seriously,	and	that	they	
have	condoned	the	wrongdoing	by	normalising	relations	and	failing	to	dissociate	
themselves	from	what	was	done.21		
	
As	the	Pluralism	Thesis	maintains,	then,	forgiveness	can	be	of	two	types.	It	can	
be	rights-waiving	forgiveness,	exercising	a	power	held	by	the	victim;	or	it	can	be	
redemptive	forgiveness,	acknowledging	that	the	offender	has	redeemed	
themselves	by	discharging	their	obligations.	But	as	the	Commitment	Thesis	
holds,	in	either	form	the	forgiver	undertakes	a	commitment	not	to	treat	the	
offender	as	standing	under	the	secondary	obligations.	Thus,	when	a	victim	
forgives,	and	in	doing	so	waives	rights	to	compensation	and	apology,	she	should	
be	understood	as	undertaking	a	commitment	to	the	offender	to	bracket	the	
matter	and	leave	it	in	the	past.	The	victim	could	waive	these	rights	without	
forgiving	–	could	say,	‘I	do	not	want	an	apology	from	you,	but	I	do	not	forgive	
you.’	But	forgiveness	is	more	than	just	waiving	rights;	it	involves	undertaking	
something	in	regard	to	the	offender.	While	this	commitment	can	be	made	by	the	
victim,	it	can	also	be	undertaken	a	person	who	is	not	the	victim	but	is	relevantly	
connected	to	the	offence.	In	one	sense,	therefore,	the	victim	has	a	special	
standing	to	forgive	that	is	not	held	by	anyone	else;	but	in	another	sense,	the	
victim	is	not	the	only	person	to	possess	standing	to	forgive.	In	either	case,	
however,	as	the	Normative	Power	Thesis	claims,	forgiveness	operates	to	alter	
obligations	by	means	of	power-holders’	normative	capacities	for	intentionally	
changing	those	obligations.		
	
																																																								
21	This	is	how	we	should	understand	the	claims	about	condonation	in	Kolnai,	‘Forgiveness.’	
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5.	
We	can	deploy	the	understanding	of	forgiveness	developed	here	to	interpret	and	
evaluate	Karl’s	request	to	Simon.	Part	of	Karl’s	becoming	remorseful,	we	can	say,	
involved	his	coming	to	see	himself	as	under	powerful	undischarged	obligations	
to	his	victims.	He	had	come	to	a	point	at	which	the	idea	of	dying	without	having	
discharged	those	obligations	was	intolerable	to	him.	Yet	he	could	not	expect	to	
be	able	to	make	up	for	his	wrongs	in	the	short	time	he	had	left.	Redemptive	
forgiveness	was	beyond	his	reach.	He	therefore	sought	the	only	way	in	which	he	
could	be	rid	of	these	obligations,	which	was	by	having	them	forgiven	by	someone	
who	has	the	power	to	do	so.	
	
One	problem,	however,	is	that	Simon	is	not	a	direct	victim	of	what	Karl	did	–	at	
best	he	is	a	member	of	the	community	being	attacked	by	the	collective	enterprise	
of	which	Karl	was	part.	Simon	could	only	forgive	Karl,	therefore,	if	there	can	be	
forgiveness	by	someone	acting	as	proxy	for	the	victim,	and	if	Simon	qualifies	as	
such	a	proxy.	Now	we	can	imagine	two	cases	in	which	forgiveness	by	proxy	
might	be	possible:	one	in	which	the	victim	has	explicitly	authorised	the	proxy	
(and	where	the	proxy	might	therefore	be	seen	as	testifying	that	forgiveness	had	
already	been	granted	rather	than	granting	it	themselves);	and	the	other	where	
the	proxy	forgives	in	the	certain	belief	that	the	victim	would	have	forgiven	had	
they	been	able	to.	There	is	no	explicit	authorisation	in	Simon’s	case.	But	what	of	
the	latter	possibility:	could	hypothetical-forgiveness-by-proxy	ever	alter	the	
normative	situation	in	the	ways	we	are	imagining?	Consider	an	analogy.	It	seems	
likely	that	there	can	be	cases	of	valid	hypothetical	consent	(if	a	friend	arrives	at	
my	house	when	I	am	out	to	borrow	a	hammer,	my	daughter	could	validly	consent	
on	my	behalf	to	their	borrowing	it).	These	seem	to	work	where	the	stakes	are	
low,	where	what	is	consented	to	is	relatively	unimportant,	and	where	the	proxy	
has	some	pre-existing	tie	to	the	principal.	Perhaps	the	same	may	go	for	
forgiveness,	since	there	can	be	forgiveness	of	all	sorts	of	very	minor	wrongs	–	
though	here	it	would	be	worth	thinking	more	about	who	can	act	as	a	proxy	(does	
it	have	to	be	someone	who	has	some	sort	of	standing	as	a	victim	of	the	offense,	
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even	as	a	relation	of	the	victim,	or	part	of	the	targeted	group?).22	However,	if	this	
analogy	is	apt	then	it	seems	unlikely	that	Simon	could	forgive	as	a	proxy:	while	
Simon	may	possibly	qualify	as	having	the	capacity	to	act	as	a	proxy,	the	decision	
to	forgive	in	this	cases	cannot	be	said	to	be	a	low	stakes	one.	Therefore,	on	the	
basis	of	the	account	developed	here,	we	should	conclude	that	Simon	was	right	
not	to	forgive.	
	
Could	it	be	said	that	the	contingent	fact	that	Karl	will	imminently	die	should	not	
be	allowed	to	dictate	whether	he	can	earn	redemptive	forgiveness?	One	thought	
here	might	be	that,	whatever	proportionality	between	the	seriousness	of	the	
offence	and	the	demandingness	of	secondary	obligations	consists	in,	it	must	be	
relativized	to	the	wrongdoer’s	expected	length	of	remaining	life.	If	this	were	
correct	then	one	might	say	that,	because	Karl	is	about	to	die,	his	secondary	
obligations	have	to	be	thought	of	as	something	he	is	at	least	in	principle	capable	
of	discharging.	However,	while	I	think	something	like	this	relativization	may	
operate	in	assessing	the	proportionality	of	penitential	(though	not	restitutive)	
secondary	obligations,	I	doubt	that	there	is	a	general	constraint	that	those	
secondary	obligations	should	be	dischargeable	within	one’s	lifetime,	or	even	that	
they	should	be	dischargeable	in	principle.	Whether	we	should	accept	such	a	
constraint	is	a	matter	for	first-order	normative	debate;	but	I	suspect	that	what	
Karl	has	done	should	be	thought	of	as	unforgivable,	that	is,	as	something	so	
wrong	that	however	long	he	were	to	live	he	would	not	be	able	to	make	up	for	
what	he	did.	
	
6.	
We	have	now	presented	the	central	argument	for	the	Alteration	Thesis	and	its	
three	component	theses.	Let	us	now	consider	how	it	deals	with	potential	
objections.	Some	might	claim	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	is	the	wrong	starting	
point	for	a	theory	of	forgiveness	because	it	inappropriately	models	forgiveness	
on	economic	relations.	For	instance,	on	the	picture	put	forward	by	P.	Twambley,	
																																																								
22	And	it	raises	tricky	questions	if	we	accept	that	forgiveness	involves	undertaking	a	commitment	
to	the	wrongdoer:	who	undertakes	it,	the	proxy	or	–	perhaps	impossibly,	if	they	are	dead	–	the	
victim?	
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and	recently	defended	by	Brandon	Warmke,	a	person’s	moral	self	is	a	ledger-like	
record	of	credit	and	debt,	and	forgiveness	is	like	waiving	a	debt.23	This	picture	
might	be	criticized	as	an	example	of	economic	thinking	encroaching	into	spheres	
in	which	it	is	not	at	home,	thereby	impoverishing	and	hollowing	out	our	moral	
ideas.	However,	while	this	may	well	be	a	valid	criticism	of	Twambley	and	
Warmke,	the	Alteration	Thesis	need	not	be	grounded	in	the	economic	model.	In	
fact,	the	grounding	relation	is	the	reverse:	the	case	of	forgiving	a	monetary	debt	
is	a	subset	of	the	wider	realm	of	normative	powers,	and	can	only	make	sense	
against	that	background.	If	we	seek	to	capture	what	is	correct	in	the	‘credit	and	
debt’	model	of	forgiveness,	we	would	do	better	to	see	forgiveness	as	a	normative	
power,	albeit	a	quite	different	power	from	that	involved	in	economic	
transactions.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	of	the	economic	model	as	anything	
other	than	an	imaginative	illustration	of	the	way	forgiveness	works.	
	
Another	criticism	might	be	that	the	Alteration	Thesis	conflates	forgiving	with	
pardoning.	However,	while	pardoning	is	a	power	to	alter	the	normative	situation	
created	by	wrongdoing,	there	are	clear	differences:	one	acquires	standing	to	
pardon	through	an	authoritative	institutional	role,	whereas	no	institutional	role	
is	necessary	for	the	standing	to	forgive;	pardon	waives	the	authority’s	right	to	
carry	out	(formal)	punishment,	whereas	forgiveness	alters	obligations	between	
wrongdoer	and	forgiver.	Forgiveness	may	also	differ	from	pardon	by	virtue	of	
what	it	takes	to	exercise	the	power	in	question.	The	common	understanding	of	a	
normative	power	is	as	a	declarative,	where	communicating	the	intention	to	alter	
the	normative	situation	through	some	specified	type	of	action	is	sufficient	–	
given	that	other	felicity	conditions,	including	competence	and	knowledge	of	what	
one	is	doing,	are	met	–	so	to	alter	the	normative	situation.24	This	seems	true	of	
pardoning;	but	it	is	less	clear	that	saying	that	one	has	forgiven	is	always	
																																																								
23	P.	Twambley,	‘Mercy	and	Forgiveness,’	Analysis	36	(1976),	pp.	84-90;	B.	Warmke,	‘The	
Economic	Model	of	Forgiveness,’	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly	97	(2016),	pp.	570-589.	See	also	
M.	J.	Zimmerman,	An	Essay	on	Moral	Responsibility	(Lanham	MA:	Rowman	and	Littlefield,	1998).	
24	According	to	Owens,	the	exercise	of	a	normative	power	is	where	‘I	change	what	someone	is	
obliged	to	do	by	intentionally	communicating	the	intention	of	hereby	so	doing.’	Owens,	Shaping	
the	Normative	Landscape,	p.	4.	
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sufficient	to	have	forgiven.25	As	Owens	notes,	it	is	reasonable	to	say,	‘I	thought	I	
had	forgiven	him,	but	now	I	realize	that	I	had	not’	in	a	way	that	it	is	not	
reasonable	to	say	‘I	thought	I	had	promised/given	permission,	but	now	I	realize	I	
had	not,’	where	the	reason	for	doubt	is	that	one	realizes	one	has	not	had	a	settled	
change	of	heart.	Against	this,	it	might	be	pointed	out	that	saying	one	has	forgiven	
does	sometimes	make	a	normative	difference	without	such	a	change	of	heart,	
and	that,	however,	one	might	wish	one	had	not	forgiven,	and	even	resent	the	
offender	whom	one	let	off	the	hook,	one	sometimes	cannot	without	unfairness	go	
back	to	treating	the	offender	as	though	they	had	not	been	forgiven.	However,	
there	can	also	be	cases	where	we	may	doubt	that	forgiveness	has	really	been	
given	even	though	the	victim	says	that	it	has.	To	explain	this,	we	might	note	that	
forgiveness,	at	the	same	time	as	being	the	exercise	of	normative	power,	can	also	
be	an	expressive	act,	that	is,	a	vehicle	for	the	expression	of	the	forgiver’s	feelings	
towards	the	events	in	question.	If	this	seems	correct,	it	may	be	that	(perhaps	as	
with	apology,	which	has	its	normative	effect	of	dissociating	the	offender	from	
their	offence	only	when	it	is	a	sincere	expression	of	remorse),	having	that	
expressive	character	may	in	some	circumstances	be	necessary	for	the	exercise	of	
the	normative	power.26	
	
A	third	criticism	might	be	that	seeing	forgiveness	as	a	normative	power	cannot	
explain	why	forgiving	can	be	an	extraordinary	achievement.	Forgiveness	can	be	
admirable,	for	instance,	because	it	can	be	an	expression	of	a	loving	character,	but	
also	a	character	that	is	courageous	and	capable	of	doing	some	very	difficult	
things.	The	Normative	Power	Thesis	might	be	said	to	make	forgiveness	too	easy.	
One	of	the	things	that	we	admire	about	those	who	forgive	can	be	some	sense	in	
which	they	sacrifice	themselves	or	place	themselves	under	a	burden	–	a	sense	
that	is	not	well-captured,	the	criticism	goes,	by	saying	that	they	exercise	a	
voluntary	power.	However,	while	this	may	be	an	apt	criticism	of	some	versions	
																																																								
25	See	the	arguments	against	the	claim	that	forgiveness	is	declarative	in	G.	Pettigrove,	Forgiveness	
and	Love	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	Ch.	1.		
26	If	this	were	the	case	if	would	need	to	be	explained	why	–	in	virtue	of	what	it	is	in	the	role	
forgiveness	plays	in	the	ethical	life	–	forgiveness	sometimes	can	be	exercised	at	will	and	
sometimes	only	expressively.	But	just	as	we	understandably	require	consent	to	be	fully	explicit	
when	the	stakes	are	high,	so	it	might	make	sense	to	require	forgiveness	to	engage	the	emotions	
when	the	wrongdoing	is	a	serious	one.	
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of	the	Alteration	Thesis,	it	is	not	a	good	criticism	of	a	version	that	includes	the	
Commitment	Thesis.	On	the	view	defended	here,	forgiveness	can	be	–	though	it	
need	not	be	–	a	difficult	and	an	admirable	achievement,	something	about	which	a	
victim	may	deliberate	and	only	be	prepared	to	do	when	they	are	‘ready,’	because	
it	involves	committing	oneself	to	the	hard	work	of	changing	one’s	heart	towards	
the	offender.		
	
7.	
Thinking	of	forgiveness	along	the	lines	suggested	by	the	Alteration	Thesis	means	
going	against	the	tide	of	much	recent	writing	on	forgiveness,	which	has	seen	
forgiveness	as	consisting	essentially	in	a	change	of	heart	towards	the	
wrongdoer.27	One	feature	that	might	favor	the	Change	of	Heart	view	is	the	
possibility	already	noted,	that	one	might	think	one	had	forgiven	but	in	fact	
realize	that	one	had	not	–	this	might	be	explained	by	the	realization	that	one	had	
not	changed	one’s	heart	in	the	way	one	would	had	one	forgiven.	However,	as	we	
have	seen,	this	supposed	advantage	might	be	accommodated	by	the	possibility	
that	forgiveness	in	some	situations	needs	to	be	exercised	expressively.	
Furthermore,	as	we	will	now	see,	the	Alteration	Thesis	has	a	number	of	
explanatory	advantages	over	the	Change	of	Heart	approach.		
	
For	instance,	on	the	Change	of	Heart	approach,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	one	would	
need	some	special	standing	–	for	instance,	being	a	victim	–	in	order	to	forgive.	It	
is	clearly	not	true	that	only	those	who	are	victims	of	the	offense	should	have	
negative	attitudes	towards	the	offender,	so	why	would	only	the	victim’s	change	
of	heart	count	as	forgiveness?	By	contrast	the	Alteration	Thesis	explains	that,	
while	other	parties	can	and	should	change	their	hearts	towards	the	offender	
when	the	normative	situation	of	the	offender	changes,	only	those	who	have	
specific	normative	powers	can	engage	in	the	act	of	forgiveness,	and	some	of	the	
powers	of	forgiveness	are	only	possessed	by	the	victim.		
	
																																																								
27	Many	examples	could	be	cited,	such	as	the	Allais	and	Hampton	pieces	already	mentioned.	See	
also	C.	Calhoun,	‘Changing	One’s	Heart,’	Ethics	103	(1992),	pp.	76-96;	P.	Hieronymi,	‘Articulating	
an	Uncompromising	Forgiveness,’	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	62	(2001),	pp.	529-
555.	
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Furthermore,	while	forgiveness	is	often	said	to	‘restore	relationships’,	the	
Change	of	Heart	view	prompts	us	to	think	that	the	obstacles	that	wrongdoing	
poses	to	the	relationship	are	psychological	–	such	as	hurt	feelings	–	and	that	it	is	
a	psychological	change	that	removes	the	obstacle.	According	to	the	Alteration	
Thesis,	by	contrast,	the	metaphor	of	restoring	relationships	is	really	a	way	of	
talking	about	the	normative	situation	arising	from	wrongdoing:	this	normative	
situation	is	the	barrier	to	normal	interaction;	forgiveness	can	take	this	barrier	
away	in	the	sense	that	it	can	alter	the	obligations	that	stand	in	the	way	of	normal	
interaction.	While	forgiveness	may	often	involve	a	change	of	heart,	what	enables	
the	forgiver	to	change	their	emotions	towards	the	wrongdoer	is	that	there	is	a	
new	situation,	a	new	normative	relationship,	for	those	emotions	to	be	about.	The	
forgiver	can	therefore	have	a	different	attitude	towards	the	wrongdoer	on	the	
assumption	that	those	attitudes	are	complex	enough	to	take	as	their	object	the	
relationship	to	the	wrongdoer	and	the	way	it	is	conditioned	by	those	
obligations.28	Forgiveness	can	enable	a	change	of	heart,	even	in	the	absence	of	
repentance,	if	it	is	possible	for	the	act	of	forgiveness	to	alter	the	normative	
situation	in	the	absence	of	repentance.		
	
While	the	Alteration	Thesis	approach	can	explain	the	change	of	heart,	however,	it	
is	hard	to	see	how	the	Change	of	Heart	approach	can	explain	the	normative	
effects	of	forgiveness.	Although	of	course	a	change	of	heart	may	motivate	a	
person	to	exercise	their	normative	power	to	forgive,	it	does	not	bring	about	such	
normative	effects	absent	this	background	of	powers.		
	
7.	
Glen	Pettigrove	recognizes	the	role	of	commitment	to	the	wrongdoer	in	his	
account	of	‘commissive	forgiving.’29	According	to	Pettigrove,	however,	the	
commitment	of	forgiveness	does	not	amount	to	undertaking	an	obligation	or	
granting	a	right	to	the	offender.	Now	I	agree	that	it	sounds	wrong	to	talk	about	
rights	in	this	context;	but	I	do	think	that	forgiveness	creates	a	directed	obligation	
																																																								
28	This	need	not	be	read	in	such	a	way	as	to	imply	a	particular	temporal	ordering:	perhaps	in	real	
life	the	elements	we	have	analyzed	as	logically	separate	are	often	psychologically	inextricably	
bound	up	with	one	another.	
29	Pettigrove,	Forgiveness	and	Love,	pp.	12-17	
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for	the	forgiver,	owed	to	the	wrongdoer.	Pettigrove’s	reluctance	to	talk	in	terms	
of	obligation	may	have	to	do	with	his	more	ambitious	view	about	the	content	of	
such	an	obligation:	he	thinks	to	forgive	is	to	forswear	retaliation	and	hostile	
attitudes,	and	to	take	up	a	positive	orientation	towards	the	offender’s	good,	
rather	than	my	more	minimal	account	of	committing	no	longer	to	treat	the	
offender	as	standing	under	obligations	of	which	they	are	now	free.	Without	such	
an	obligation,	however,	it	is	not	clear	what	the	act	of	forgiveness	adds	to	a	
situation	in	which	it	is	acknowledged	on	all	sides	that	the	wrongdoer	has	done	all	
that	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	make	up	for	the	wrong.	If	one	lashes	out	at	
such	a	person	by	reminding	them	of	the	wrong	they	committed	then,	in	the	case	
where	one	has	not	forgiven	them,	one	may	have	acted	wrongly,	and	wronged	
that	person	by	treating	them	unjustly;	however,	if	in	addition	one	has	forgiven	
then	there	is	an	extra	element	to	one’s	wrong,	since	one	has	acted	contrary	to	the	
relational	structure	put	in	place	by	one’s	undertaking	of	a	commitment.	One	has	
a	further	thing	to	reproach	oneself	for.		
	
It	might	seem	odd	to	think	that	forgiveness	should	involve	giving	normative	
authority	to	the	person	who	wronged	you.	However,	it	is	hard	to	explain	why	
one	might	be	wary	of	forgiving	before	one	is	ready,	and	how	it	can	happen	that	
one	forgives	on	impulse	and	then	regrets	it,	without	appeal	to	the	role	of	
forgiveness	in	creating	new	normative	bonds.	Nevertheless,	although	these	
bonds	must	be	robust	enough	to	account	for	the	phenomenon	of	regret	over	
having	forgiven,	forgiveness	should	not	be	thought	of	as	a	once-and-for-all	
signing	away	of	one’s	right.	On	the	one	hand,	then,	the	normative	change	
wrought	by	forgiveness	must	be	more	robust	than	changes	wrought	by	the	kind	
of	consent	that	can	be	revoked	whenever	one	changes	one’s	mind	–	such	as	
sexual	consent.	Forgiveness	does	involve	binding	oneself.	However,	it	is	also	the	
case	that	the	wrongdoer	can,	by	a	failure	in	their	own	redemptive	commitments,	
forfeit	their	new	normative	position.	The	secondary	obligations	that	we	
undertook	to	treat	as	no	longer	salient	can	come	back	into	play	as	not	in	fact	
having	been	discharged,	and	in	those	circumstances	the	forgiver	is	within	their	
rights	(though	not	necessarily	obligated)	to	revoke	their	forgiveness.	The	victim	
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who	had	waived	their	right	to	apology	and	compensation	may	in	these	
circumstances	even	have	a	power	to	reinstate	that	right.		
	
Furthermore,	even	in	the	case	in	which	we	violate	the	terms	of	our	own	
forgiveness,	and	thereby	wrong	the	initial	wrongdoer,	it	may	be	odd	to	think	that	
this	gives	the	wrongdoer	a	right	in	turn	to	demand	an	apology.	I	should	reproach	
myself,	but	that	is	not	necessarily	to	say	that	I	can	be	reproached	by	him.	Why	
should	this	be?	It	is	worth	bearing	in	mind	the	overall	metaphor	of	forgiveness	as	
a	gift	in	this	context.	Although	I	have	argued	that	forgiveness	is	not	simply	like	
granting	a	favor,	the	gift	metaphor	is	appropriate	because	giving	sets	up	a	new	
normative	structure.	Giving	transfers	rights,	and	makes	wrongs	of	some	of	the	
things	the	giver	might	go	on	to	do	(taking	the	gift	back	without	permission,	say,	
without	exceptional	justifying	circumstances).	Therefore,	in	giving	the	giver	
places	herself	under	an	obligation	to	the	recipient.	However,	the	context	of	being	
the	beneficiary	of	the	giver’s	generosity	(and	in	this	sense	being	in	their	debt)	
affects	the	recipient’s	standing	to	make	demands	and	ask	for	apologies	when	
those	obligations	have	been	violated.	While	some	violations	will	be	sufficiently	
egregious	to	give	the	recipient	grounds	to	insist	on	their	right,	and	even	to	
demand	an	apology,	the	threshold	that	makes	this	appropriate	is	higher	given	
the	context	of	the	gift.	It	can	be	appropriate	for	the	recipient	of	a	gift	to	overlook	
violations	of	the	rights	they	have	been	granted,	and	not	to	insist	on	their	right	or	
demand	the	apology	that	would	have	been	appropriate	had	the	context	not	
involved	a	gift.	Indeed,	in	insisting	on	their	rights	and	demanding	an	apology	the	
recipient	may	end	up	forfeiting	those	rights,	and	making	it	permissible,	or	even	
appropriate,	for	the	giver	to	withdraw	the	gift.	Something	similar	may	happen	in	
forgiveness:	even	if	it	is	not	appropriate	to	talk	about	the	forgiven	offender	
having	rights	over	the	victim,	insisting	on	those	rights	or	forfeiting	them,	the	
analogous	phenomenon	is	that	some	of	the	wrongdoer’s	behavior	post-
forgiveness	(such	as	insisting	excessively	on	the	forgiver’s	obligation	to	them)	
can	have	the	effect	of	weakening	or	cancelling	the	forgiver’s	obligation	to	the	
offender.	
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Suppose,	however,	that	I	forgive	you,	and	waive	your	obligations	to	apologize	
and	compensate	me,	but	then	resent	the	fact	that	you	didn't	apologize	or	
compensate	me	voluntarily.	Does	my	resentment	wrong	you?	This	can	be	the	
case	–	that	is,	if	my	resentment	involves	the	claim	that	one	continues	to	stand	
under	an	obligation	to	have	done	these	things	voluntarily,	when	in	fact	I	have	
released	you	from	that	obligation	–	but	need	not.	It	would	not	be	correct	to	say	
that	the	forgiver’s	attitude	to	the	wrongdoer	should	have	no	reference	
whatsoever	to	the	wrong.	The	commitment	of	forgiveness	is	compatible,	for	
instance,	with	feeling	disappointed,	perhaps	even	resentful,	at	the	nature	of	the	
wrongdoer’s	response	to	their	wrongdoing	(their	not	having	responded	
voluntarily).	The	situation	would	then	be	that	the	forgiver	no	longer	sees	the	
wrongdoer	as	owing	them	apology	and	compensation,	but	nevertheless	feels	
disappointed	that	the	wrongdoer	had	to	be	released	from	these	obligations	
rather	than	complying	with	them	because	they	felt	their	force	(and	might	feel	
resentful	if	resentment	can	similarly	be	directed	towards	failings	that	do	not	
necessarily	imply	the	continuing	existence	of	the	now-waived	secondary	
obligations).	Another	such	situation	might	be	where	the	forgiver	forgives	in	part	
with	the	intention	of	provoking	a	reaction	in	the	wrongdoer	–	as	in	the	famous	
Valjean	case	in	Les	Miserables.	Here	again	the	forgiver	has	released	the	
wrongdoer	from	certain	obligations,	but	may	feel	disappointed	if	their	overture	
(i.e.	their	offering	forgiveness	as	a	kind	of	extension	of	the	hand	of	friendship)	is	
not	responded	to	in	good	faith.	They	may	even	feel	that	in	forgiving	they	have	
placed	the	wrongdoer	under	a	new	obligation	to	reciprocate,	and	may	feel	that	
the	wrongdoer	has	violated	that	new	obligation	if	he	does	not	reciprocate.	All	of	
this	is	compatible	with	seeing	the	wrongdoer	as	free	of	the	secondary	obligations	
that	have	now	been	waived.	Furthermore,	as	noted	earlier,	if	the	wrongdoer’s	
response	is	sufficiently	inappropriate	(and	the	victim	may	have	wide	authority	to	
determine	whether	this	is	so)	this	might	have	the	effect	of	cancelling	the	
forgiver’s	secondary	obligation.	
	
I	have	offered	a	pluralistic	account	of	forgiveness,	and	it	might	be	asked	why	
forgiveness	should	consist	in	this	bundle	of	features:	what	provides	its	unity.	Is	
my	view	simply	an	ad	hoc	bundling	together	of	intuitively	attractive	things	that	
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we	want	to	say	about	forgiveness,	or	does	it	have	some	internal	logic?	On	the	
view	put	forward	here,	forgiveness	involves	entering	into	the	normative	realm,	
binding	oneself	and	affecting	the	way	others	are	bound,	in	regard	to	a	situation	
that	has	been	created	by	an	act	of	wrongdoing.	The	thing	that	provides	internal	
coherence	to	this	is	the	overall	function	that	forgiveness	has	in	social	life,	which	
is	to	allow	for	wrongdoers	to	be	re-accepted,	once	and	for	all,	as	it	were,	without	
the	authority	of	the	norms	that	they	violated	being	placed	in	question.									
Forgiveness	must	therefore	have	an	element	that	acknowledges	the	wrongs	as	
wrongs;	but	it	must	also	have	an	element	that	waives	the	obligations	that	stand	
in	the	way	of	normalizing	relations,	or	acknowledges	that	they	have	been	
discharged;	and	an	element	that	binds	the	parties	not	to	keep	on	re-opening	the	
matter	but	rather	to	bracket	it,	leave	it	in	the	past,	and	move	on.	Those	are	the	
elements	that	are	captured	in	the	account	that	has	been	given	in	this	paper.30	
	
The	above	gives	an	explanation	of	the	social	function	of	forgiveness	–	but	does	it	
explain	why	being	forgiven	matters	to	us	as	individuals?	Say	someone	has	paid	
their	moral	debts,	and	is	aware	that	they	have	done	so.	Furthermore,	they	are	
																																																								
30	As	I	mentioned	in	n.	27,	these	elements	should	also	guide	our	thinking	in	what	actions	and	
attitudes	are	necessary	and	sufficient	for	the	exercise	of	forgiveness.	In	discussing	promising,	
Searle	argues	that	one	who	declares	to	others	that	she	has	promised	really	has	done	so,	even	if	
she	has	no	intention	of	making	good	on	the	promise	(J.	Searle,	Speech	Acts,	Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1969).	But	we	might	think	that	the	same	does	not	hold	for	
forgiveness.	If	a	person	appears	to	grant	forgiveness,	yet	has	no	intention	of	attempting	to	fulfil	
the	obligations	undertaken	to	the	wrongdoer,	it	would	seem	that	she	has	not	forgiven	at	all.	This	
would	suggest	that	at	least	having	the	intention	is	necessary	for	forgiveness	–	and	the	fact	that	
there	is	a	difference	from	promising	might	be	explained	by	the	role	that	forgiveness	plays	in	
allowing	a	social	group	to	draw	a	line,	once	and	for	all,	as	it	were,	and	move	on	from	wrongdoing	
without	constantly	re-opening	the	issue.	Just	as	a	firm	decision	precludes	re-opening	the	matter	
(at	least	up	to	a	certain	threshold	of	urgency)	and	allows	a	person	to	settle	their	mind	on	a	
question,	so	forgiveness	allows	social	relations	to	be	settled.	If	we	consider	another	problem	
case,	answers	again	usefully	emerge	from	thinking	about	the	overall	role	of	forgiveness.	In	
Marilynne	Robinson’s	Gilead,	for	instance,	it	turns	out	from	a	conversation	with	the	victim	that	
the	main	character,	who	had	been	worrying	away	about	the	wrong	he	had	done	her,	had	been	
‘forgiven	long	ago’	but	never	knew.	This	example	raises	the	question	whether	the	Alteration	
Thesis	requires	that	forgiveness	the	granting	of	forgiveness	be	by	means	of	a	communicative	act	
(as	with	promise	or	consent,	which	require	communicative	acts	for	the	normative	power	to	have	
been	exercised)	or	whether	it	can	be	done	privately.	If	the	role	of	forgiveness	is	to	allow	relations	
with	the	wrongdoer	to	be	settled	once	and	for	all	then,	although	we	would	often	expect	it	to	be	
important	to	communicate	this	to	the	wrongdoer,	it	does	not	seem	strictly	necessary	that	it	
should	be.	Just	as	with	a	decision,	a	person	might	undertake	the	commitment	privately	in	order	
to	settle	things	with	the	wrongdoer	and	move	on.	If	forgiveness	is	given	privately,	the	forgiver	
would	nevertheless	be	bound	to	the	wrongdoer	to	treat	them	otherwise	than	as	standing	under	
the	now-waived-or-discharged	obligations.		
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aware	that	a	potential	forgiver	is	aware	that	they	have	done	so.	They	really	want	
forgiveness	from	that	person,	yet	that	potential	forgiver	has	not	forgiven	them.	Is	
my	account	able	to	explain	why	forgiveness	can	reasonably	seem	so	important?	
On	my	view,	what	the	repentant	wrongdoer	wants	is	a	commitment	from	the	
forgiver	to	put	the	wrong	in	the	past	that	is	more	formal	than	simply	a	shared	
sense	that	the	wrong	is	in	the	past.	A	virtue	of	my	account	is	that	it	can	
acknowledge	the	multitude	of	reasons	for	which	this	can	be	important.	It	is	
worth	noting	that	we	would	not	expect	such	a	wrongdoer	to	want	forgiveness	
from	everyone	who	has	the	standing	to	blame	them;	such	an	attitude	would	
appear	disproportionate,	even	self-indulgent.	Nevertheless,	it	seems	realistic	to	
think	that	it	might	quite	rightly	matter	to	them	to	be	forgiven	by	one	or	more	
particular	people.	One	key	context	would	be	the	realm	of	personal	relationships,	
in	which	the	demands	of	mutual	commitment	and	mutual	certainty,	as	well	as	
the	heightened	dangers	of	slights	and	misunderstandings	with	emotionally	
costly	consequences,	can	easily	be	seen	to	lend	themselves	to	wanting	clarity	
about	the	normative	relations	in	which	we	stand	to	one	another.	This	is	not	to	
say	that	every	relationship	need	give	a	role	to	something	like	forgiveness	as	I	
have	outlined	it:	it	may	be	that	either	highly	easy-going,	highly	mutually	attuned,	
or	highly	unself-conscious	creatures	could	get	along	without	it.	But	I	suspect	for	
most	of	us	there	is	a	role	for	forgiveness	from	time	to	time.		
	
A	further	strength	of	the	pluralistic	account	of	forgiveness	put	forward	here	is	
that	it	can	account	for	cases	in	which	conditions	for	one	sort	of	forgiveness	have	
been	met,	but	not	another,	and	where	we	might	therefore	feel	confused,	if	we	are	
operating	with	a	monistic	account,	about	whether	we	should	say	that	forgiveness	
has	been	given	or	not.	For	instance,	as	I	have	already	noted,	Karl’s	case	should	be	
thought	of	as	one	in	which	all	that	he	can	properly	ask	for	is	rights-waiving	
forgiveness;	given	his	fatal	injuries,	he	is	not	in	a	position	to	make	amends	and	
earn	redemptive	forgiveness	(even	were	such	a	thing	possible	in	principle	for	
wrongs	of	such	gravity).	This	is	not	to	say	that	Karl	himself	is	clear	about	this	
distinction,	and	that	he	realizes	he	cannot	redeem	himself,	or	die	with	a	clear	
conscience.	It	might	be	part	of	his	moral	failure	that	he	is	blind	to	the	need	to	
earn	redemptive	forgiveness,	and	that	he	thinks	that	a	word	from	a	victim	(or	at	
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least	one	related	to	the	victims)	would	be	enough.	A	more	charitable	
interpretation	of	Karl	would	have	to	ask	why	it	can	sometimes	be	important	to	
gain	rights-waiving	forgiveness	in	a	case	in	which	there	is	no	hope	of	gaining	
redemptive	forgiveness.	And	part	of	the	answer	to	that	might	be	that	Karl	is	
driven	by	the	hope	of	showing	that	he	is	not	simply	a	monster:	that	in	addressing	
one	who	was	victimized	by	the	deadly	project	of	which	he	was	part,	recounting	
the	awfulness	of	what	he	did,	expressing	his	hope	to	be	forgiven,	and	putting	
himself	under	the	(normative)	power	of	the	one	whose	weakness	he	and	his	
compatriots	had	attempted	ruthlessly	to	exploit	(to	the	point	of	extermination)	–	
that	in	this	exercise	of	humility	he	might	achieve	something	that	shows	he	is	
more	than	what	he	did	to	his	victims.	Whether	this	is	admirable	on	Karl’s	part,	
and	a	plausible	explanation	of	what	he	did,	we	cannot	decide	here.	But	
structurally	similar	cases	exist,	and	the	point	is	that	there	can	be	an	intelligible	
and	even	admirable	point	to	asking	for	rights-waiving	forgiveness	even	when	
redemptive	forgiveness	is	impossible.	
	
There	can	also	be	cases	in	which	a	wrongdoer	has	done	everything	that	can	be	
expected	of	them	to	make	amends,	but	has	not	yet	been	forgiven	by	the	victim,	
and	desperately	wants	to	be.	On	my	account,	we	should	understand	this	situation	
as	one	in	which	the	wrongdoer	either	wants	rights-waiving	forgiveness,	or	they	
yet	want	the	victim	to	undertake	an	obligation	to	treat	and	see	them	as	no	longer	
standing	under	the	obligations	they	have	now	discharged.	The	second	of	these	
certainly	seems	psychologically	plausible,	if	not	always	reasonable:	in	an	
intimate	relationship	with	a	person,	one	might	have	the	reasonable	belief	that	
one	has	made	proportionate	amends	(and	apologized	proportionately,	etc.),	but	
might	also	wish	for	a	forgiving	commitment	to	put	the	matter	in	the	past,	even	if	
one	feels	unable	to	ask	for	such	a	thing,	and	even	if	one	rejects	the	idea	that	the	
victim	could	be	under	any	duty	to	undertake	such	a	commitment.	But	is	the	first	
also	plausible:	that	the	wrongdoer	feels	they	continue	to	stand	under	certain	
obligations	to	the	victim,	and	wishes	to	have	these	waived,	despite	having	made	
all	proportionate	amends?	One	possible	case	is	that	the	victim	has	made	it	
impossible	for	the	wrongdoer	to	apologize	and	make	compensation	as	they	wish	
to,	for	instance	by	cutting	all	contact.	In	this	case	the	wrongdoer	may	have	‘done	
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enough,’	all	things	considered,	to	make	up	for	their	wrong,	but	their	desire	for	
forgiveness	could	reflect	the	pull	of	unmet	directed	obligations.	Nevertheless,	I	
doubt	that	the	victim	should	always	be	said	in	such	cases	to	have	a	right	to	the	
apology	that	could	be	waived	by	forgiveness.	Say	the	victim	relents	some	years	
down	the	line,	and	renews	contact	with	the	offender	–	does	the	offender	then	still	
have	an	obligation,	correlative	to	a	right	of	the	victim,	to	offer	an	apology?	In	
cases	of	serious	wrongdoing,	the	answer	may	be	yes,	but	if	we	extend	that	to	all	
cases	we	would	be	granting	victims	an	extraordinary	level	of	normative	control	
over	offenders;	perhaps,	then,	in	many	cases	the	stringency	of	the	obligation	to	
apologize	simply	fades	with	time.	Another	possible	case	is	where	the	offender	
has	offered	apology	and	compensation,	and	has	therefore	made	the	remedial	
efforts	that	the	directed	obligations	demand,	but	that	offer	has	been	refused	–	so	
neither	apology	nor	compensation	has	been	accepted	(or	perhaps	the	
compensation	has	but	the	apology	has	not).	If	the	wrongdoer	continues	to	want	
to	be	forgiven,	could	it	be	based	on	the	perception	that	the	victim	still	has	an	
outstanding	right	–	e.g.	that	the	offender	continues	to	attempt	to	apologize?	This	
seems	implausible,	after	a	certain	point	in	which	‘reasonable’	efforts	have	been	
made:	an	obligation	to	apologize	is	not	an	obligation	to	have	that	apology	
accepted.	Perhaps	we	should	say	in	that	case	that	the	offender’s	desire	is	for	the	
commitment	of	forgiveness,	as	above,	rather	than	rights-waiving	forgiveness.	
The	victim,	that	is	to	say,	does	not	have	exclusive	control	over	rights	to	apology	
and	compensation,	since	the	correlative	duties	can	be	discharged	even	if	the	
victim	refuses	to	waive	them	(or	to	accept	that	they	have	been	discharged).	Once	
again,	although	the	victim	has	a	central	place	in	forgiveness,	it	is	important	not	to	
over-state	their	powers.	
	
8.	
In	this	paper,	I	have	argued	that,	in	order	to	explain	why	forgiveness	motivates	
actions	such	as	Karl’s	(and	many	more	mundane	versions	of	such	quests	to	seek	
out	the	victim’s	forgiveness),	forgiveness	has	to	be	thought	of	as	more	than	a	
simple	change	of	heart,	and	rather	as	involving	an	alteration	of	the	normative	
situation.	The	Alteration	Thesis	can	explain	Karl’s	motivation,	since	only	the	
victim	can	waive	the	right	to	apology	and	compensation.	Nevertheless,	the	
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Alteration	Thesis	as	I	have	understood	it	here	does	not	fall	into	the	trap	of	taking	
victim’s	forgiveness	to	be	the	only	form	of	forgiveness,	or	attributing	too	wide	a	
scope	of	forgiveness	to	the	victim.	I	have	argued	that	certain	expiatory	
obligations	of	the	wrongdoer	cannot	be	taken	away	by	the	victim,	but	must	
rather	be	discharged	by	the	wrongdoer	herself.	However,	forgiveness	still	adds	
something	distinctive	to	the	normative	situation	even	in	these	redemptive	cases,	
because	forgiveness	involves	binding	oneself	to	the	wrongdoer	by	undertaking	
an	obligation	to	them	not	to	treat	them	as	still	under	the	secondary	obligations	
arising	from	their	wrongdoing.	In	this	sense	forgiveness	involves	undertaking	
(unless	the	wrongdoer	should	forfeit	their	new	normative	position)	to	keep	the	
slate	wiped	clean.	This	explains	why	forgiveness	might	be	a	struggle	that	a	victim	
of	wrongdoing	might	be	unprepared	to	take	up,	or	which	it	is	wise	to	take	up	
only	when	ready,	or	which,	indeed,	one	might	come	to	regret.	
